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It is to be here noted that the jurisdiction of the Small Claims
Court is not at all mandatory, but is merely a supersedure to the
established practice in the municipal court. If the claimant elects to
avail himself of the benefits which the Small Claims Court has to
offer, he of necessity makes certain concessions. By proceeding under
this title the plaintiff waives a jury trial 36 and all rights to appeal
except on issues of substantive law.37  The defendant,38 neverthe-
less, is not precluded from demanding a jury trial. In fact, the
summons informs him that if, in good faith, he feels that certain
issues of fact may merit it, he may secure such a trial by paying ajury fee of $6.00 and by filing an undertaking 3 9 or posting cash to
the amount of fifty dollars. This, he is informed, is to secure to the
plaintiff any costs which may be awarded him.
40
The court may in its discretion remand any small claim to an-
other part of the municipal term and proceed to try it there accord-
ing to the prevailing rules of practice and procedure. 4 1 In that event
the plaintiff will be deemed to have waived nothing in the Small
Claims part.4
2
This then, is the present situation of the New York City Small
Claims Courts. How far these tribunals will alleviate the ills that
beset our body judicial cannot now be accurately foretold. Surely
the legislature has correctly diagnosed the major ailments and has
left a group of physicians who are closely observing the patient's
convalescence and who stand by ready to administer further restora-
tives if found necessary.
CARL E. ALPER.
THE UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPT AcT.-The Uniform Trust Re-
ceipt Act' was enacted in New York State on May 14, 1934, and
went into effect on July 1, 1934. As a result of this, New York
became the first state of the Union to adopt this Act. The statute
as it has been adopted is in form a duplicate of the eighth tentative
draft of the Committee on Uniform Trust Receipts Act of the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and
"Supra note 6, §184.
"Id. §185.
"Or any interested party other than the plaintiff.
Supra note 14, Rule XI, "The undertaking to be filed * * * shall be in
the form prescribed by Rules 26 and 27 of the N. Y. C. P. A."
' Supra note 6, §184. Where defendant demands a jury trial, plaintiff
must be notified of that fact. Supra note 14, Rule XII.
"Id. §183.
Id. §184.
'N. Y. CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF 1934, c. 574, now §§50-58L of N. Y.
PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW.
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Procedure,2 which was approved by resolution of the American Bar
Association.3
The primary purpose of this article is to convey to the reader
an interpretation of the Uniform Trust Receipt Act as it now exists,
as part of the consolidated laws of New York State. However, in
making this survey and study of the Act, the writer has found that
an understanding of the history, origin and legal nature of the trust
receipt agreement is an indispensable factor in reaching any careful
and intelligent determination as to legal effects of this statute. It
is therefore with this vital consideration in view that the writer
deviates from his main purpose in presenting a survey of the history,
origin and legal nature of the trust receipt agreement.
A typical situation involving a trust receipt is found where a
bank advances money to enable a buyer, who has no ready funds, to
purchase goods. The bank takes the bill of lading for the goods in
its own name, but thereafter surrenders it to the buyer under a type
'of agreement known as a trust receipt. This agreement usually states
that the title shall remain in the bank, while the goods shall be placed
in the possession of the buyer to be disposed of or warehoused by
him. Such of the proceeds are paid to the bank as will repay it
(the bank) for the sums advanced by it under this agreement, to the
buyer, together with its customary charge or commission. The agree-
ment usually includes a provision whereby the buyer agrees to store
and fully insure the goods so purchased and to deliver the storage
and insurance papers to the bank. Another familiar provision usu-
ally found in these agreements gives the bank the right to cancel
the trust at any time and repossess itself of the goods, or of the
proceeds of the sale of the goods. This device of security was first
utilized in importing, although in recent years it has been extended
to mercantile financing of dealers in machinery, automobiles and the
like. The bank usually extends the purchase price 4 on behalf of
the buyer or importer. The bank takes legal title and not merely
the interest of a pledgee, nor does the bank lose its interest by re-
leasing possession of the goods to the buyer for the purpose of
processing, shipping, manufacture or even sale. 5
2For comparison see c. 574 of Consolidated Laws of New York, 1934,
for the act as adopted and see "Handbook of the National Conferences of
Commissioners of UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEDURE" (1933) pp. 256-270.
The draftsman of the act was Professor Karl N. Llewellyn.
"Report of the President to the American Bar Association," pp. 122-123
of HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEDURE.
'The bank need not pay the purchase price but may instead accept a bill
of exchange drawn upon it, or may issue a letter of credit to the borrower's
seller, in any event, however, the bank becoming personally liable.
'This is a copy of the actual trust receipt agreement signed by the parties
in the case of In re Cattus, 183 Fed. Rep. 733. The only difference is that
wherever "bank" is used by this writer, the actual agreement states the name
of the agent for the bank.
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John M. Zane, of the Chicago Illinois Bar, in his discussion of
the ancient Greek case of Zenothenis v. Demon 6 places the origin
of the trust receipt far back to the classical times of Demosthenes, the
Greek orator. This type of contract in all its essential elements has
continued through the ages and up to the present time as a very im-
portant phase of credit in importing transactions.
The earliest cited case which seems to resemble the trust receipt
situation was decided by Judge Story in 1843. 7 In this case the
bankrupt had borrowed money from the plaintiffs to be used in the
purchase of goods. Under agreement between the parties, the prop-
erty so purchased was to be pledged as security for the loan, the
bankrupt to hold the bills of lading for the plaintiffs' account. This
action was in equity to establish a lien on the property. judge Story
decided for plaintiffs, holding "the agreement is binding upon the
property in the hands of the assignee, fit to be enforced in the present
"New York ......................... 19 
"Received from ................... through their representative
.................. (bank) ............ of New York, the following goods and mer-
chandise their property specified in the bill of lading per ..............................
Shipped by .............................. and in consideration thereof, we hereby agree
to hold said goods in trust for the above named bankers, and as their
property, with liberty to sell the same for their account, and in case of
sale to give .................. (bank) ............ the name of the purchasers, and to
hand them the avails, as soon as received, as security for due provision
and for the acceptance of the said bankers, on our account, noted at
foot; and we further pledge to them said goods and the proceeds of
such as security for the payment of any and every other indebtedness
of ours to the aforesaid bankers, whether matured or unmatured, accord-
ing to its terms. In case the above mentioned goods are sold we agree
to store and fully insure the same, and hand the storage and insurance
papers to ............ bank ........ It is also agreed that ............ (bank) ............
may at will cancel this trust at any time, and repossess themselves of
their said property in whatever condition it may then be, or of the
proceeds of such of the same as may then have been sold, wherever the
said goods or proceeds may then be found, and in the event of any
insolvency, suspension, or failure, or assignment for benefit of creditors
on our part, or of the non-fulfillment of any obligation, or of the non-
payment, either at maturity or upon previous demand by the said
.................. (bank) ............ , of any acceptance made for us under said
credit or any other credit issued by .................. (bank) ............ , on our
account, or of any indebtedness on our part to either of them, all
obligations, acceptances, indebtedness and liabilities whatsoever shall
thereupon (with or without notice) mature and become due and payable.
"We further agree to keep said property fully insured against fire,
payable in case of loss to .............. (bank) .............., we to pay any expenses
incurred thereon, the intention of this arrangement being to protect and
preserve unimpaired their lien on said property as security for any and
all obligations on our part then outstanding."
See In re James, Inc. (C. C. A. 1929), 30 F. (2d) 555 for example of
copy used in domestic transactions.
'Zane, A Modern Instance of Zenothenis v. Damon (1925) 23 MICH. L.
REV. 339; KARL FREDERICK, ESQ., THE TRUST RECEIPT AS SECURITY, pp. 30-38.
"Fletcher v. Morey, 2 Story 555 (C. C. 1843).
CURRENT LEGISLATION
suit." 8 The case also held that this so-called trust receipt would be
valid as against all persons except bana fide purchasers for valuable
consideration and without notice. Barry v. Boninger,9 decided in
1877, seems to be the earliest reported case which uses the term
"trust receipt." The transaction involves an importation (which was
the first and most common form of enterprise to utilize the trust
receipt) and the substance of the agreement resembles those now
used. The decision of the court held the property of the goods to
be in the bankers under the letters of credit and the trust receipt.
Other forms of chattel security, besides the trust receipt, are the
pledge, conditional sale and the mortgage. Though resembling in
some of its features each of these popular security devices, it does
not conform to any of these types of security, but is itself an in-
dependent form of security. Nor can those who utilize the trust
receipt be satisfied by the use of any of these other security devices.
Let us first compare the trust receipt with the conditional sales
agreement to which it bears a marked resemblance. A conditional
sale as defined by the Uniform Sales Act 10 is
"(1) Any contract for the sale of goods under which posses-
sion is delivered to the buyer and the property in the goods is to
rest in the buyer at a subsequent time upon the payment of a part
or all of the price, or upon the performance of any other condition
or the happening of any contingency; or
"(2) Any contract for the bailment or leasing of goods by
which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum
substantially equivalent to the value of the goods, and by which it
is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or has the
option of becoming the owner of such goods upon full compliance
with the terms of the contract." From our understanding of the
nature of the trust receipt agreement it is not very difficult to see
how closely these two agreements resemble each other. Legal title,
in both cases, is in the one who has extended the credit. Possession,
in both cases, is usually delivered to the debtor (called the buyer in
trust receipt cases). Again, in both instances, title by stipulation is
passed to the buyer only upon the payment of the agreed amount.
Risk of loss is usually on the buyer." And, while it is not infre-
'Id. at 570. Other early cases which develop the essential principle of the
trust receipt doctrine are: Dows v. National Exchange Bank of Milwaukee,
91 U. S. 618 (Sup. Ct. 1875); Mechanics and Traders' Bank v. Farmers and
Mechanics' National Bank, 60 N. Y. 40 (1875). In this case the court held
that even if the importer should sell and deliver the goods to an innocent
purchaser for value, without paying the proceeds to the bank, the bank would
still be entitled to the goods as against the bona fide purchaser.
-46 Md. 59 (1877).
'IN. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §61.
'In re McElheny, 91 App. Div. 131, 86 N. Y. Supp. 326 (Ist Dept. 1904).
Here the court said, "the burden of loss in shipment is upon the one who has
contracted with the banker * * *"
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quent that the buyer in the case of a trust receipt agreement may sell
before payment, yet the buyer in the conditional sales contract may,
too, upon consent of the one who holds legal title, sell his interest.
Some courts have even construed trust receipts to be conditional
sales.12  Yet upon close analysis distinctions between the two can be
readily seen, and the courts have held the trust receipt not to fall
within the recording acts.'8 The chief distinction is that, although
there is a retention of title in the banker, it fundamentally is not a
selling transaction and was never intended by the parties to be such.
The holder of the trust receipt does not sell the goods to the importer
or trader but merely lends him credit and advances the money for his
account. The bank has ownership merely for security-a limited
security interest. 14  Another distinction is that in a conditional sale,
possession cannot be retaken until a default; whereas under the
trust receipt the holder usually has the power to reclaim possession
of the goods at any time.15
We now consider the trust receipt and the chattel mortgage.
The chattel mortgage is a recognized form of security usually trans-
ferring the general property of the goods or security title to a credi-
tor for the purpose of securing a debt. In both trust receipt and
chattel mortgage, upon the payment of the money owed, the owner-
ship will be transferred to the true owner. Possession, in both cases,
is usually in the debtor. There is definite authority in some states
that a trust receipt is a chattel mortgage.16  Professor Williston 17
12I re Ford-Rennie Leather Co., 2 F. (2d) 750 (1924). In New Haven
Wire Co. Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18 Atl. 266 (1888), the majority of the court
held the agreement to be a conditional sales agreement, while the dissenting
opinion, written by Judge Carpenter, argued that this agreement was a
mortgage.
In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918). Here
although the holder the trust receipt was defeated on the grounds that the trust
agreement was a conditional sale, yet the court makes a distinction between the
trust receipt and the conditional sale, saying, on page 664, "In a trust receipt
transaction the banker acquires the title for a particular customer-the importer
-by advancing the purchase price for him to the foreign vendor without
expectation of reward other than an almost nominal commission for the services
rendered. The vendor in the ordinary conditional sales contract is other than
a banker and has by the expenditure of his fund acquired the ownership of
the article sold, without reference to any particular' purchaser, and contemplates
an actual profit to himself in its disposal.
See also authorities cited in (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 545, n. 31.
"Commercial Credit Corp. v. Northern Westchester Bank, 256 N. Y. 482,
177 N. E. 12 (1931). In this case the Court of Appeals held that neither the
chattel mortgage nor conditional sale recording acts were applicable to trust
receipts.
"Drexel v. Pease, 133 N. Y. 129, 36 N. E. 732 (1892).
'WHITNEY, LAW OF SALES (2d ed. 1934) §133.
1" General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Boddecker., 274 S. W. 1016 (Civ.
App. of Texas 1925); It re Shuttig, 1 F. (2d) 443 (1924). Contra: In re
Ford-Rennie Leather Co., 2 F. (2d) 750 (D. Del. 1924).
'Williston, Progress of the Law (1919-1920) 34 HARv. L. REv. 741, 759.
Prof. Williston here places his distinction merely on the basis of business
expediency.
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seems to consider the trust receipt transaction as a form of chattel
mortgage stating that the only reason for not requiring filing or
recording is because it would be better to leave unprotected such
persons who may be deceived by apparent ownership in the importer,
rather than to hamper a form of business so necessary and vital to
the progress of the commercial world by calling it a mortgage and
hence requiring filing. But the rule, generally, and in New York,
is that the trust receipt is not a chattel mortgage but an independent
form of security agreement.' 8 The distinction is clearly made by
Karl Frederich 19 and is based on the fact that in the case of a
chattel mortgage title usually comes to the mortgagee from the mort-
gagor, whereas, in the case of trust receipt title comes to the bank
from a third person other than the importer or domestic buyer.20
Nor can we correctly call the trust receipt a common law pledge
transaction. A pledge depends upon continued possession of the
property in the one secured and when possession is lost, the pledge
is extinguished.21  Briefly stated "no possession, no lien." How-
ever, it is also true that the delivery of possession back to the owner
for a temporary use will not destroy the pledge.22 But in the trust
receipt device the bank does not want possession of the goods. It
wants title for its protection and the trust receipt has usually been
held not a pledge. 23 In re Cattus,24 the court said, "the purpose of
'lit re Cattus, 183 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910) ; In re Shulman, 206 Fed.
129 (D. C. 1913); In re Fountain, 282 Fed. 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); In re
James, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
" KARL T. FREDRICnH, THE TRUST RECEIPT AS SECURITY (1922) 17-23.
Although Mr. Frederich admits that generically the trust receipt is a chattel
mortgage yet he says that it should not be so classed. His reasons for this
are based on the magnitude and volume of the trust receipt business in com-
merce and the fact that were we to call this a mortgage and require filing, the
burden and expense would be enormous and the delay and hampering caused
by filing necessity, would result in rendering the use of the trust receipt vastly
impractical and destroying its utility.
'Snpra note 17; In re James-In this case the court's opinion states that
the essential element of the trust receipt is that title comes to the lender
directly from a third person. it re Fountain, 282 Fed. 816, 827 (C. C. A. 2d,
1922), it was held (and this decision is in accord with Frederich's viewpoint)
that "it makes no difference whether the bills of lading run directly to the
banker or whether they run to the seller's order and are endorsed to the
banker, so long as title is not allowed to pass to the person for whose benefit
the transaction is undertaken until the bank has acquired its interest."
'Black v. Bogert, 65 N. Y. 601 (1875); Homes v. Crane, 2 Pick. 607
(Mass. - ); Whitaker v. Sumner, 20 Pick. 399 (Mass. - ).
'Britton v. Harvey, 16 So. 747, 47 La. Ann. 259 (1895); Rose v. Coble,
61 N. C. 517 (1868); In re New York Transportation Co., 276 Fed. 145 (D.
Del. 1921); Marx v. Marx, 223 Ky. 339 (1928). But see Blue v. Herkimer
National Bank, 20 F. (2d) 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), in which the court held
that if too much control for his benefit is left in the pledgor upon redelivery
the pledge may be invalidated.
In re Richeiner, 221 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) ; Moors v. Kidder, 106
N. Y. 32, 12 N. E. 818 (1887); In re James, 30 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A. 2d,
1929). However, see Hanna, Trust Receipts (1924) 29 COL. L. REv. 545, 548,
for the view that fundamentally the trust receipt is a pledge.
", 183 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).
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the parties, describe the trust receipt as you will, was to keep the
title to the goods in the bankers until their acceptances for the price
of the goods are paid."
At this time .we come to the discussion of the common law
doctrine of trust receipts. Our question now is, what legal relation-
ship is created by the trust receipt transaction. It is proper to note
at this time, that the litigation which has arisen is infrequently a
controversy between the banker and the customer. As between these
two parties, the contract itself is sufficiently clear to establish their
respective rights and has led to no real difficulties. The conflict is
usually between the banker who has advanced credit or money and
the creditors of the buyer (importer or dealer) who has become
insolvent before payment to the banker. Between these two parties
who is entitled to the goods (or the proceeds, if a sale of the goods
has-been made)? That is why most of the litigation in these cases
has arisen in the federal courts (under the Federal Bankruptcy
Laws) in a contest between the banker and the receiver or trustee
for the benefit of creditors of the bankrupt buyer.
The general tenor of the decisions in the federal courts has been
to uphold the rights of the banker and to allow him to recover the
goods or the proceeds 25 thereof as against the trustee in bankruptcy
for the benefit of creditors.2 6 The basis of these decisions is on the
theory that the title to the goods remains in the banker under the
terms of the contract until payment of the proceeds. Another im-
portant reason assigned, is that it would be "inequitable" to' the
banker to hold otherwise, and further, that the continuance of this
well-established and useful commercial custom depends upon this
protection of the bankers.
It is worth while to quote from the opinion in one of these cases.
In Charaway v. York Silk Co., 27 the court said:
"It is not necessary to find in the nomenclature of security re-
lations a category in which to place this one. It is governed by the
contract of the parties, and the contract will only be disturbed by the
courts for illegality." And in the same case: "We see nothing in
the evidence in this case that shows any conduct or act on the part
of the plaintifts by which they would be estopped to assert their
title and ownership to the goods in question, so far as the same
Generally, the bank may recover the proceeds of the sale when they can
be identified. Also, if the buyer has sold under power of sale and the purchase
price not yet collected, the banker may notify the purchaser of his rights
thereto and collect from the purchaser who will be liable for the bank for a
refusal to do so. Thayer v. Dwight, 104 Mass. 254 (1870) ; Dows v. Kidder,
84 N. Y. 121 (1881); for a full discussion of the creditors' rights to the
proceeds see FREDERICH, THE TRUST RECEIPT AS SECURITY, pp. 73-85.
" Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912) ; In re
Killion Manufacturing Co., 215 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 3d, 1914); In re Cattus, 183
Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Charavay and Bodvin v. York Silk M'f'g Co.,
170 Fed. 819 (C. C. S. D. 1909).
- 170 Fed. 819 (C. S. D. 1909).
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would serve to protect them in respect to the liability incurred by
them for the acceptances made in the purchase of such goods. To
hold otherwise would be to strike down a bona fide and honest trans-
action of great commercial benefit and advantage and founded upon
a well-recognized custom by which banking credit is efficiently
mobilized for manufacturers and importers of small means."
In two important cases, the federal courts refused to uphold
the banker. lit re Garcewich,28 the first of these cases, the federal
court assigned as its reason for not upholding the trust receipt trans-
action the fact that the sale was by a manufacturer to one of his
customers who gave back a trust receipt to the manufacturer. This
was on the theory that title must come to the creditor from a third
person. In the second of these cases, In re Liberty Co.,29 the trust
receipt was poorly drawn and the court held that the trust receipt
was nothing more than an unrecorded mortgage or "secret lien."
We now come to several later federal cases, an analysis of
which tends to exemplify how the trust receipt transaction is mis-
understood. In 1895, the case of Blydenstein v. New York Sec. and
Tr. Co.30 was decided. The facts show that a foreign firm having
a branch in New York delivered bills of lading of goods, shipped to
themselves in New York to a banker in London who is the plaintiff
in the action. These bills of lading were later delivered to the New
York branch of the foreign firm under a trust receipt giving power
of sale. The New York branch warehoused the goods and deliv-
ered the negotiable warehouse receipts to the defendant as security
for a present loan. The debtor firm then became insolvent. Had
this been a true trust receipt transaction, plaintiff would have been
upheld. But it was not such a transaction, for title of the bank to
the proceeds come from the debtor himself so that it was really
a chattel mortgage and the defendant was upheld on the basis of
the Factors Act. In re Shuttig,' the court again upheld a similar
transaction to be nothing more than a chattel mortgage which should
have been recorded to protect the bank's interest.3 2 In Jordan v.
- 115 Fed. 87 (C. C. A. 2d, 1902).
152 Fed. 844 (D. C. S. D. 1907).
- 67 Fed. 469 (C. C. A. 2d, 1895). The same principle was upheld in the
case of In re Carl Dernberg and Sons, Inc.
'1 F. (2d) 443 (D. C. D. N. J. 1924),
"The basis of the court's reasoning is the distinction made by Mr.
Frederich in his article The Trust Receipt as Security, between a true trust
receipt and a chattel mortgage. Frederich says, "The distinction is one that
exists in fact-it is real and is clear-cut and workable. This ground of differ-
entiation is the fact that title does not pass to the bank from the importer but
rather from a third person. The importer has never held the legal title. He
has arranged a purchase money mortgage to the banker, who makes the loan,
without himself appearing in the chain of title. No one is deceived by the
fact that the bank has acquired a security title which is unrecorded, because
there is no 'retention of possession' by the importer. He has never had either
possession or title."
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Federal Trust Co.,3 3 the courts again held a trust receipt to be in-
valid and ineffectual as against the trustee in bankruptcy. Here
the goods had been delivered to a "so-called public warehouse" which
was really a storage house of the buyer and again the court on the
basis of Mr. Frederich's distinction held it to be a chattel mortgage
and not a true trust receipt.
One more important federal decision must be considered, the case
of In re James, Inc. (1929).3 4 This case considers as settled the
rule that for a valid trust receipt to exist, title must necessarily come
from a third person other than the buyer; and that the use of the
trust receipt is equally proper for domestic transactions as well as
importation situations. The case is also authority for the rule that
where a true trust receipt exists, with a power of sale in the buyer,
the Factors' Act will be a protection, not to a trustee in bankruptcy
but only to a subsequent bonau fide purchaser for value or a specific
lienor.
In the sister states of the Union, we find a great deal of judicial
confusion and diversity of holdings as to the true concept of the
trust receipt transaction. Some cases have held the trust receipt to
be a conditional sale.35 Others have held it to be a bailment but good
against general creditors.30 Still others have construed it to be a
chattel mortgage. 37  In New York the courts have held that title is
in the banker as against the theory that he has a mere lien.3 8  The
New York courts have also held that the chattel mortgage and con-
ditional sale recording acts are inapplicable to trust receipts. 39 The
logical result of this last ruling is that they recognize the trust re-
ceipt as an independent security device. In Massachusetts 4o and
Wisconsin,41 the courts have similarly held title to be in the banker,
but have held the transaction to be a conditional sale. In Pennsyl-
vania, 42 the court held the trust receipt to be a bailment.
'Jordan v. Fed. Trust Co., 296 Fed. 738 (D. Mass. 1924).
30 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), rev'g District Court's decision in
30 F. (2d) 551, holding that some of the trust receipts were chattel mortgages
and others were conditional sales contracts.
'New Haven Wire Co. Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18 Atl. 266 (1889); Ohio
Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Schneider, 202 Iowa 938, 211 N. W. 248
(1926).
'Brown Bros. v. Billington, 163 Pa. St. 76, 29 Atl. 904 (1894).
'General Motors Acceptance Corp v. Boddeker, 274 S. W. 1016 (Texas
1925); Mohr v. First National Bank, 69 Cal. App. 756, 232 Pac. 748 (1924).
a' Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 (1878) ; Moors v.
Kidder, 106 N. Y. 32 (1887). True, in these cases the court does not call the
agreement a trust receipt, yet it was analogous to such an agreement.
' Commercial Credit Corp. v. Northern Westchester Bank, 256 N. Y. 482,
177 N. E. 12 (1931).
"I Moors v. Wyman, 146 Mass. 60, 15 N. E. 104 (1888) ; Moors v. Drury,
186 Mass. 424, 71 N. E. 810 (1904).
"Mersbon v. Moore, 76 Wis. 502, 45 N. W. 28 (1890).
12-Supra note 36.
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As we have previously stated, apparently New York upholds the
banker's title except as it might conflict with the Factors' Act.
43
That is: where the banker has entrusted the goods to the buyer with
authority to sell or pledge, the innocent purchaser for value will be
protected as against the banker even though there be a limitation
on the power to sell or pledge which has been violated by the buyer.
For the purpose of protecting a purchaser, under this Act, the buyer
(agent) will be deemed to be the true owner of the goods. But, it
is also proper to note here that the Factors' Act is applicable only
where the purchaser had no notice that the one from whom he pur-
chased was not the true owner.44
Similarly, in those states where the Uniform Bills of Lading Act
and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act have been adopted, and
where the subject matter of the trust receipt agreement is a nego-
tiable bill of lading or negotiable warehouse receipt, a bona fide
purchaser or pledgee of the receipt will acquire good title, even though
there existed a limitation on the authority of the agent.45 New York
is one of the states which has adopted these two statutes.4 6
Primarily, the purpose of the Uniform Trust Receipt Act is
to clarify the confusion which has resulted from the diverse judicial
views relating to this greatly misunderstood business practice. The
legislators realized that only through uniform legislation could we
expect the development of a logical, symmetrical trust receipt doc-
trine. We may observe such an attempt in Section 6, Uniform Chat-
tel Mortgage Act 47 (not at this writing adopted in any state), which
treats the trust receipt as a mortgage and requires the filing thereof,
in the same way as a chattel mortgage. But this is obviously un-
satisfactory, for it leaves untouched trust receipts given for pledges
of choses in action. The only direct legislation on trust receipts is
the Ohio Statute.48 However, though the filing requirements are
satisfactory yet it is limited to importing transactions and one or two
isolated situations of domestic business. The act as adopted in New
York (and made part of the Personal Property Law of this state)
applies equally to security interests in documents, goods or instru-
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1, §8568 (as amended in 1925) of Ohio General Code. The only domestic
transactions covered by the Statute are sales of "readily marketable staple
goods wherever purchased." The statute provides for the filing of an affidavit
concerning the trust receipt, which will protect the entruster's (bank) interest
as against all creditors of the signer (buyer) except purchasers or mortgagees
in good faith and for value. Filing under this section is deemed to be notice
of the entruster's rights for three years.
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ments.49 Under Section 52, a trust receipt transaction includes any
arrangement between an entruster 5o and a trustee 5' whereby:
(a) a lender holding a security interest in goods or documents
delivers such goods or documents to the borrower against a written
trust receipt or written agreement to give a trust receipt;
(b) a lender advances value 52 in reliance upon the transaction
to such lender of a security interest in documents actually shown to
the lender. but retained by the borrower against a written trust re-
ceipt or written agreement to give a trust receipt. The security in-
terest of the entruster may be derived from the trustee directly or
from ay other person 5 and by pledge or by transfer of title or
otherwise. The trust receipt agreement should be in writing and
signed by the trustee 54 but need not be in any particular form to be
valid. To be valid as a trust receipt the possession of the trustee
must be for one of three purposes:
(1) for purpose of sale or exchange;
(2) in case of goods to be manufactured or processed with the
view of ultimate sale or for unloading, storing, shipping and the like
in a manner necessary or preliminary to their sale.
(3) in case of instruments for the purpose of delivery to a
principal under whom the trustee is holding them, or for consum-
mation of some transaction involving delivery to a depositary or reg-
istrar, or for their presentation, collection, or renewal. 5
It is important to note, with reference to the above matter, that
under the statute, title may come to the bank or entruster from either
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instruments for profit, who, at the outset of the transaction has as against the
buyer, general property in such goods or instruments and who sells the same
to the buyer on credit, retaining title or other security interest under a purchase
money mortgage or conditional sales contract or otherwise is excluded."
"Id. §51, subd. 14, defines trustee as: "the person having or taking
possession of goods, documents or instruments under a trust receipt transaction,
and any successor in interest of such person. The use of the words 'trustee'
shall not be interpreted or construed to imply the existence of a trust or any
right or duty of a trustee in the sense of equity jurisprudence other than as
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the trustee or a third person. Under the common law rule as estab-
lished, if the importer or domestic buyer happened to get title into
himself before the execution of the trust receipt agreement, the courts
would construe the agreement to be an unrecorded chattel mortgage
and hence void against the trustee in bankruptcy.56 The result of
this section is to do away with what has sometimes been called "an
artificial distinction" and will lead to the enforcement of the agree-
ment, with accord to the real intent of the parties. The Act also
excludes chattel mortgage situations and conditional sale contracts
except in peculiar and rare cases.57
Section 53 of the Personal Property Law relates to attempted
pledges of property when not accompanied by delivery of possession
to the pledgee and applies to cases which do not fall within the cate-
gory of trust receipts. Such a pledge is valid as against creditors of
the pledgor, only to this extent:
(a) if the pledgee has given new value 58 in reliance thereon, it
shall be valid against all creditors with or without notice for ten
days;
(b) if no new value has been given or if the ten-day period in
the case of new value has lapsed, the pledge shall be valid as against
lien creditors without notice only us of the time the pledgee takes
possession. The result of this Section is to defeat any possibility of
masking what in substance would be an unrecorded chattel mortgage
under the form of an agreement to pledge or "equitable pledge." It
also tends to exclude the use of agreements to pledge, dated back
more than four months in order to fraudulently obtain a preferred
position in an insolvent estate.
Section 54 of the Personal Property Law makes a contract to
give a trust receipt, followed by delivery of the goods, documents
or instruments equivalent to a trust receipt provided that the contract
be in writing and signed by the trustee and under Section 55 any
agreement between trustee and entruster shall be valid except as it
provides for forfeiture of the trustee's interest in any way except as
provided by Section 56, subdivision 5.
Under the common law there was no limitation on the en-
truster's right to retake the goods from the trustee or to sell the
goods himself. But Section 55 and Section 56 limit this right. The
limitations thereon are as follows:
(1) The entruster may retake on default or where the trust
receipt agreement gives him the right. 9 To recover possession
"Supra note 33.
' §51, subd. 1; §52, subd. 3, lq. Y. PERSONAL PROp. LAW.
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thusly, the entruster may even take possession without legal process,
whenever that is possible without breach of the peace. 60
(2) The surrender of trustee's interest shall be valid on any
terms upon which the parties may, after default, agree. 61
(3) After entruster has regained possession upon default he
may serve or send notice to trustee of his intention to sell, at least
five days before the sale. The sale may be public or private and
if the sale is public the entruster may himself become the purchaser.
The proceeds shall be applied in the following order:
(a) to payment of the expenses of the sale;
(b) to payment of expenses of storage and retaking;
(c) to the satisfaction of the balance due from the trustee;
and any balance over and above shall be paid to trustee. If there is
any deficiency, the trustee shall be personally liable therefor.
Even though the entruster shall become liable to the trustee for
conversion, in not following the statutory requirements for the sale,
yet a purchaser for value and in good faith from an entruster in
possession takes good title.62 There is yet a further limitation upon
the right of entruster who has retaken possession to sell, and that is
in the case of articles manufactured by style or model.63 All in all,
the statute provides a direct and effective foreclosure procedure, and
preserves to the trustee an equity of redemption where none was
provided for under the common law of trust receipts. As a result,
the trustee has a right to redeem, and in addition there is a strong
possibility of a greater price being realized on foreclosure.
The theory of the legislators was to afford to the entruster pro-
tection against the honest and bona fide insolvency of the trustee for
that is the true purpose of the trust receipt. Yet at the same time,
they carried in mind that bona fide purchasers should be protected
in case of dishonest action on the part of the trustee. For, dis-
honesty of the trustee is a credit risk and the one who has placed
the confidence in a dishonest person should bear the full risk, rather
than the innocent purchaser. This is based on the common law
doctrine of equitable estoppel that where one of two innocent per-
sons must suffer loss from the wrongful act of a third person such
loss shall be borne by him, who has placed the third person in the
position which enabled him to do the wrongful act causing the loss.
And this is fair as to the entruster for he usually permits the trans-
action only after personal investigation, knowledge and judgment of
the prospective borrower. How far these principles have been car-
ried out is now to be seen.
'o Id. §56, subd. 2.
" Id. §56, subd. 4.
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If the entruster files within the period of thirty days, after the
delivery of the goods, documents or instruments, his security interest
in documents or goods will generally be protected against all per-
sons. 64 If he should fail to file during the thirty-day period but should
file subsequently, his interest will be valid as of the time of filing.65
The taking (by the entruster) of possession of goods, documents or
instruments, shall have the same effect from time of taking posses-
sion as filing.66 As a result of this, there is no possibility of de-
feating general creditors by belated filing or taking back possession
under an unfiled trust receipt. Even should the entruster fail to
file, his interest against all creditors of the trustee, with or without
notice, would be protected for thirty days after the delivery of the
goods, documents or instruments.6 7
However, as to lien creditors who become such after the thirty-
day period, and without notice, and before filing, the entruster's in-
terest will be void.68 The section also serves to give a trustee or re-
ceiver in bankruptcy the same preferred position as occupied by lien
creditors 69 unless the entruster has filed or taken possession. The
general effect of this section is to prevent a person's getting an unfair
and fraudulent preference over a lien creditor, or permitting one to
unfairly or fraudulently exhaust and deplete the trustee's assets. This
is done by requiring as a condition precedent that the entruster file
or have possession and thereby tends to assure honesty in the trans-
action. It is a direct blow to "secret liens."
A very important provision is the one which protects the bona
fide purchaser for value and without notice of a negotiable instru-
ment or document held by the trustee subject to a trust receipt.70
Nor will filing be deemed notice to one who is otherwise a holder
in due course. The obvious reason for this rule is in keeping with
the principle of the Negotiable Instruments Law that there be free
circulation of a negotiable instrument and this can only be obtained
by giving the fullest protection to the purchaser of such an instru-
ment. Generally, the entruster's interest is valid against purchasers
even though there be no filing.
Where the trustee has been given liberty of sale 71 and sells to
Id. §57, subd. 1 (a).
SId. §57, subd. 1 (b).
'Id. §57, subd. 2.
Id. §58, subd. 1.
Id. §58, subd. 2.
' Id. §58, subd. 2 (b) (iii).0 d. §58-a, subd. 1 (a).
""The consent of the entruster to placing of goods subject to a trust
receipt transaction in the trustee's stock in trade or in his sales or exhibit
room, or allows such goods to be so placed or kept, such consent or allowance
shall have the effect of granting the trustee liberty of sale." Under the
common law, even though the entruster consented to release the goods to a
dealer who exhibited them in his show room with other goods of like nature,
it was still held not to be apparent authority to sell. See Utica Trust and
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a buyer in the ordinary course of trade,72 the buyer will get good
title and that is so whether the thirty-day period has elapsed or not,
and irrespective of the fact that filing has been accomplished. 73 Fur-
ther, even if there be a limitation on the liberty of sale, the buyer in
,the course of trade is still protected unless it can be shown that he
actually knew of this limitation.74  We think the correctness and
fairness of these rules need not be questioned.
But if a purchaser be not a buyer in the ordinary course of
trade, he will get good title when, in good faith and without notice
of the entruster's interest and before filing, he:
(a) gives new value before the thirty-day period has elapsed, or
(b) gives value after said period and in addition obtains de-
livery of goods. 75
Section 58-b regulates the rights of the entruster to receive the
proceeds of a sale, where the trustee had no liberty of sale or where
he, having liberty of sale, has failed to give account to the entruster
of the proceeds. At common law, the rules relating thereto were
very indefinite and uncertain.76
Section 58-c alters the common law rule. At common law the
entruster was protected against the specific lien of a warehouseman,
or processer,77 but under this section, whether the entruster has
filed or not, the specific lienor who deals with the goods preparatory
to their sale, shall be entitled to his lien for the debt due him. This
does not include the lien of a landlord nor does it personally obligate
the entruster for the debt.78
The mere fact that the entruster has given a liberty of sale to
the trustee, is insufficient to hold said entruster responsible as prin-
cipal or as vendor under any sale or contract to sell made by the
trustee.
79
Before the passage of this Act, no filing requirements for trust
receipts existed, except in those jurisdictions where the trust receipt
was held to fall into the category of a conditional sale or chattel
mortgage. Filing in these jurisdictions was required only because
the laws of those jurisdictions required the filing of the conditional
sales agreement and chattel mortgages. But no state or jurisdiction
which recognized the trust receipt as an independent security device,
required filing as a condition precedent to validity. Under the Uni-
Deposit Co. v. Decker, 244 N. Y. 340, 155 N. E. 665 (1927). It was to
remedy this situation that the above quoted section was included in the Act.
' Id. §50, subd. 1.
Id. §58-a, subd. 2 (a) (i).
"'Id. §58-a, subd. 2 (b).
Id. §58-a, subd. 2 (b).
, See KARL F.EaEicH, ESQ., THE TRUST RECEIPT AS SECURITY, c. 7.
Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912).
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form Act now being considered, provision is made for the filing of
trust receipt transactions. To see what constitutes filing under the
Act, we must consult Section 58-e. Under this section, it is not
every individual trust receipt transaction, which need be filed to in-
sure the entruster of the privileges resulting from filing. The en-
truster need only file a statement containing:
1. A designation of the entruster and trustee and their re-
spective places of business within the state;
2. A statement that the entruster is engaged in financing the
trustee's acquisition of goods under trust receipts;
3. A description of the kind of goods to be covered by such
financing.
It therefore seems that the entruster need file only one such state-
ment, which will be sufficient to cover a series of transactions. Pro-
vision is also made for refiling of statements at any time before the
expiration of the validity of the first filing.80 One of the chief
business complaints assigned against the filing requirement was that
to require filing would place an intolerable burden and expense upon
any entruster doing a voluminous amount of financing business under
trust receipts, and might discourage the use of this device. Perhaps
this is why we do not require the filing of each individual trust re-
ceipt. To say the least, the burden thrust upon the entruster is
under our statute manifold less than the amount of work and money
involved in filing each individual receipt. For example, one state-
ment filed by the entruster will be sufficient to cover numerous trust
receipts in which 'the same trustee is involved. Where a transaction
falls within the provisions of this Act and any other law requiring
filing, the entruster has the right to elect under which law he will
file and his filing under this right of election shall be sufficient to
continue his protection under this Act.8 '
How well the Act will solve the glaring defects of the common
law idea of trust receipts is too uncertain to allow for accurate
prophecy. Suffice to say, in conclusion, that the Act is the culmina-
tion of instructive research and study of the many perplexing prob-
lems involved in the subject matter at hand with a view of producing
a logical, fair, comprehensible and practical trust receipt doctrine.
MosEs J. KATZ.
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